MIND & SOCIETY
Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences |
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| 1, 2012, Mind & Society, vol.11 |
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Special issue on:
Dual Process Theories of Human Thought: The Debate
Laura Macchi • David Over • Riccardo Viale
Preface
There has been increasing interest in recent years in dual process theories of human thought. This special issue of Mind & Society reflects this interest, some criticisms of these theories, and the major topics that have been discussed and debated as a result. There is the basic topic of how the postulated dual processes should be defined in the first place. Do these processes have essential defining features that can be distinguished from less central correlates? Can decoupling, metarepresentation, or working memory be used for making the essential distinction?
There are questions about how these dual processes work and interact. What do dual process theories tell us about different modes of thought and insight in problem solving? One topic that could throw light on these questions is creative thinking. It deals with novelties and yet can be rule following. It can be an aspect of hypothetical thinking, but how far it is a conscious or unconscious process is still unknown. There is the much studied but unsettled question of the relation between dual processes and human rationality, whether epistemic or practical. What is the relation between the two processes and the intentional attitudes and the pragmatic processing of contextualised information? And how do the two processes interact with feelings and emotions?
There are also questions about how dual process theories are related to the new probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of reasoning. To use de Finetti's distinction, the new paradigm goes beyond the idealised logic of certainty in the old paradigm to the much more realistic logic of uncertainty, and to even more general probabilistic accounts of human reasoning. To cope with all the uncertainty in real-world reasoning and decision making, the two processes must compute probabilities or degrees of belief, but how is this done?
These are some of the important questions addressed in this special issue by leading researchers on human thought. There is a final article by Jonathan Evans, whose writings have done so much to stimulate recent developments in dual process theory. His contribution reflects on the other articles in this special issue and their major themes.
Articles:
Keith E. Stanovich • Maggie E. Toplak
Defining Features Versus Incidental Correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing
Abstract
Many critics of dual-process models have mistaken long lists of descriptive terms in the literature for a full-blown theory of necessarily co-occurring properties. These critiques have distracted attention from the cumulative progress being made in identifying the much smaller set of properties that truly do define Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Our view of the literature is that autonomous processing is the defining feature of Type 1 processing. Even more convincing is the converging evidence that the key feature of Type 2 processing is the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary representations. The latter is a foundational cognitive requirement for hypothetical thinking.
Mike Oaksford • Nick Chater
Dual Processes, Probabilities, and Cognitive Architecture
Abstract
It has been argued that dual process theories are not consistent with Oaksford and Chater’s probabilistic approach to human reasoning (1994, 2007: Oaksford et al, 2000), which has been characterised as a “single-level probabilistic treatment[s]” (Evans, 2007, p. 98). In this paper, it is argued that this characterisation conflates levels of computational explanation. The probabilistic approach is a computational level theory which is consistent with theories of general cognitive architecture that invoke a WM system and an LTM system. That is, itis a single function dual process theory which is consistent with dual process theorieslike Evans’ (2007) that use probability logic (Adams, 1998)as an account of analytic processes.
This approach contrasts with dual process theories which propose an analytic system that respects standard logic binary truth functional logic (Heit & Rotello, 2010; Klauer, Beller, & Hütter, 2010; Rips, 2001, 2002; Stanovich, 2000, 2011). The problems noted for this latter approach by both Evans (2002, 2007) and Oaksford and Chater (1991, 1998, 2007) due to the defeasibility of everyday reasoning are rehearsed. Oaksford and Chater’s (2010) dual systems implementation of their probabilistic approachis then outlined and its implications discussed. In particular, the nature of cognitive decoupling operationsare discussed and a Panglossian probabilistic position developed that can explain both modal and non-modal responses and correlations with IQ in reasoning tasks. It is concluded that a single function probabilistic approach is as compatible with the evidence supporting a dual systems theory
Shira Elqayam • David Over
Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning
Abstract
In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of analysis. Moreover, we propose that, within the new paradigm, these levels of analysis reflect on each other. Bayesianism suggests a specific theoretical understanding of dual processing. Just as importantly, the duality in processing carries over to duality in function; although both types of processes compute degrees of belief, they generate different functions.
Keith Frankish
Dual systems and dual attitudes
Abstract
It can be argued that dual-system theorists should adopt an action-based view of System 2 (S2), on which S2 reasoning is an intentional activity. It can also be argued that they should adopt a dual-attitude theory, on which the two systems have distinct sets of propositional attitudes. However, Peter Carruthers has argued that on the action-based view there are no S2 attitudes. This paper replies to Carruthers, proposing a view of S2 attitudes as virtual ones, which are partially realized in S1 attitudes. This view is compatible with, and a natural extension of, the action-based view.
Laura Macchi • Maria Bagassi
Intuitive and analytical processes in insight problem solving: a psycho-rhetorical approach to the study of reasoning
Abstract
Language and thought share a unitary cognitive activity, addressed by an interpretative function. This interpretative effort reveals the assonance between the meaning attribution to an utterance and the discovery of solution via a restructuring process in insight problem solving. We suggest a view of complex integrated thinking, which assumes that thinking processes information in different ways, depending on the characteristics of the tasks the subject has to solve, so that reasoning results in a stepwise, rule-based process or in a widespread activity of search where implicit parallel processes are also involved. We investigated the interrelationship between language and thought on insight problem solving, in both its positive effects (Experiments 1 and 3) and its negative effects (Experiment 2).
Our evidences are discussed in the light of the debate on dual processing theories.
Tilmann Betsch • Carsten Held
Rational Decision Making: Balancing RUN and JUMP Modes of Analysis
Abstract
Rationality in decision making is commonly assessed by comparing choice performance against normative standards. We argue that such a performance-centered approach blurs the distinction between rational choice and adaptive behavior. Instead, rational choice should be assessed with regard to the way individuals make analytic decisions. We suggest that analytic decisions can be made in two different modes in which control processes are directed at different levels. In a RUN mode, thought is directed at controlling the operation of a decision strategy. In the JUMP mode, the individual analyses the interpretation of the decision situation as well as the appropriateness of alternative strategies. We suggest that a decision should be considered “rational” when an individual is able to switch between these modes and balance their interaction.
Hugo Mercier
The social functions of explicit coherence evaluation
Abstract
Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation have social functions. They are used as means of epistemic vigilance- to evaluate what other people tell us. They can also be turned inwards to examine the coherence of our own beliefs. Their function is then to minimize the chances that we are perceived as being incoherent. Evidence from different domains of psychology is briefly reviewed in support of these hypotheses.
Valerie Thompson • Kinga Morsanyi
Analytic Thinking: Do You Feel Like It?
Abstract
A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 processing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson, 2009). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that fluently produced answers give rise to a strong feeling of rightness. This feeling of rightness, in turn, determines the extent and probability with which Type 2 processes will be engaged. Because many of the intuitions produced by Type 1 processes are fluent, it is common for them to be accompanied by a strong sense of rightness. However, because fluency is poorly calibrated to objective difficulty, confidently held intuitions may form the basis of poor quality decisions.
Ron Sun • Robert C Mathews
Implicit Cognition, Emotion, and Meta-Cognitive Control>br>
Abstract
The goal of this research is to understand the interaction of implicit and explicit psychological processes in dealing with emotional distractions and meta-cognitive control of such distractions. The questions are how emotional and meta-cognitive processes can be separated into implicit and explicit components, and how such a separation can be utilized to improve self-regulation of emotion, which can have significant theoretical and practical implications.
Jonathan St B T Evans
Spot the difference: distinguishing between two kinds of processing
Abstract
Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr’s computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct cognitive and neural systems need to be demonstrated. Other distinctions raised in the issue are the unique ability for metarepresentation, cognitive decoupling and hypothetical thinking at the Type 2 level, and the association of emotion and metacognitive feelings with the Type 1 level. The relation of the latter to cognitive control is also discussed.
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