MIND & SOCIETY
Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences |
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| 1, 2011, Mind & Society, vol.10 |
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Articles:
Nicolas Baumard
Punishment is not a group adaptation – Humans punish to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperation
Abstract
Punitive behaviours are often assumed to be the result of an instinct for punishment. This instinct would have evolved to punish wrongdoers and it would be the evidence that cooperation has evolved by group selection. Here, I propose an alternative theory according to which punishment is a not an adaptation and that there was no specific selective pressure to inflict costs on wrongdoers in the ancestral environment. In this theory, cooperation evolved through partner choice for mutual advantage. In the ancestral environment, individuals were in competition to be recruited in cooperative ventures and it was vital to share the benefits of cooperation in a mutually advantageous manner. If individuals took a bigger share of the benefits, their partners would leave them for more interesting partners. If they took a smaller share, they would be exploited by their partners who would receive more than what they had contributed to produce. This competition led to the selection of a sense of fairness, a cognitive adaptation aiming to share equally the benefits of cooperation in order to attract partners. In this theory, punishment is not necessary for the evolution of cooperation. Punitive behaviours are only a way to restore fairness by compensating the victim or penalizing the culprit. Drawing on behavioural economics, legal anthropology, and cognitive psychology, I show that empirical data fit better with this framework than with the theory of group selection. When people punish, they do so to restore fairness rather than to help the group.
Saradindu Bhaduri • Hemant Kumar
Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to innovate: Tracing the motivation of ‘Grassroot’ innovators in India
Abstract
Extrinsic motivations like intellectual property protections and fiscal incentives continue to occupy the centre stage in debates on innovation policies. Joseph Schumpeter had, however, argued that the motive to accumulate private property can only explain part of innovative activities. In his view, “the joy of creating, of getting things done” associated with the behavioural traits that “seek out difficulties…and takes delight in ventures” stand out as the most independent factor of behaviour in explaining innovation and economic development, especially in early capitalist societies. Taking the case of ‘grassroot’ innovators in India, we re-examine the motivations behind innovative behaviour. Drawing upon the theory of effectance motivation we construct operational indicators of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to innovate. Interestingly, we find that pure extrinsic forms of motivation drive only a fraction of individual innovative behaviour. A large amount of innovative behaviour is motivated either by intrinsic motivations or by a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Also, conceptualising innovation as a three stage process involving idea generation, experimentation and application, we find evidence of motivation-shifts. The importance of intrinsic motivation is comparatively greater during the early stage, when uncertainty about innovation is high. The importance of extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, increases when innovation is complete, awaiting application. We then outline a few implications of these findings for policy making.
Lisa M. Osbeck • Nancy J. Nersessian
Affective problem solving: Emotion in research practice
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of emotional and affectively toned discourse in biomedical engineering researchers' accounts of their problem solving practices. Drawing from our interviews with scientists in two laboratories, we examine three classes of expression: explicit, figurative and metaphorical, and attributions of emotion to objects and artifacts important to laboratory practice. We consider the overall function of expressions in the particular problem solving contexts described. We argue that affective processes are engaged in problem solving, not as simply tacked onto reasoning but as integral to it. The examples we present illustrate the close relation of emotion to problem solving and experimentation; they also implicate social and cultural dimensions of emotion expression. The analysis underscores a need to consider emotional expression to be intimately and importantly tied to the cognitive achievements and social negotiations of laboratory practices.
Afzal Upal
From individual to social counterintuitiveness: A cognitive model of the spread of culturally counterintuitive ideas
Abstract
The emerging field of cognition and culture has had some success in explaining the spread of counterintuitive religious concepts around the world. However, researchers have been reluctant to extend its findings to explain the widespread occurrence of culturally counterintuitive ideas in general. This article develops a broader notion of social counterintuitiveness to include ideas that violate shared expectations of a group of people and argues that the notion of social counterintuitiveness is more crucial to explaining cultural success of surprising ideas than the traditional notion of individual counterintuitiveness. Building on the context-based account of individual counterintuitiveness, the article also outlines how the once unorthodox cultural ideas become conventionalized over time only to be swept under the next wave of cultural innovation. By helping us peel away the layers of tradition that weave together the multilayered tapestry of culture, this account can be useful for understanding the development of cultural scaffolding that is needed to support the spread of maximally counterintuitive concepts such as widespread religious concepts of God and ghosts.
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