MIND & SOCIETY
Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences |
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| 2, 2008, Mind & Society, vol. 7 |
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Articles:
Massimiliano Carrara • Marzia Soavi
Ontology for information systems. Artefacts as a case study
Abstract
The goal of the paper is to analyse some specific features of a very central concept for top-level ontologies for information systems: i.e. the concept of artefact. Specifically, we analyse the relation to be a copy of that is strongly linked to the notion of artefact and – as we will demonstrate – could be useful to distinguish artefacts from objects of other kinds. Firstly, we outline some intuitive and commonsensical reasons for the need of a clarification of the notion of artefact in ontologies for information systems, and we analyse some characterisations of the notion given by two top-level ontologies (Cyc and Wordnet). Secondly, we introduce and critically analyse Tzouvaras’ notion of copy. Thirdly, we try to complete an analysis of copy by distinguishing three kinds of copies: replicas (Tzouvaras’ notion of copy), rigid copies, and functional copies. With the help of these three notions we outline a first and preliminary distinction between artefacts, objects of art and natural objects.
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
Model validity and semantics of information
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between reality and model, information and truth. It will argue that meaningful data need not be true in order to constitute information. Information to which truth value cannot be ascribed, partially true information or even false information can lead to an interesting outcome such as technological innovation or scientific breakthrough. In the research process, during the transition between two theoretical frameworks, there is a dynamic mixture of old and new concepts in which truth is not well defined. Instead of veridicity, correctness of a model and its appropriateness within a context are commonly required. Despite empirical models being in general only truthlike, they are nevertheless capable of producing results from which conclusions can be drawn and adequate decisions made.
Vittorio Girotto • Katya Tentori
Is domain-general thinking a domain-specific adaptation?
Abstract
According to Kanazawa (2004), general intelligence, which he considers as a synonym of abstract thinking, evolved specifically to allow our ancestors to deal with evolutionary novel problems while conferring no advantage in solving evolutionary familiar ones. We present a study whereby the results contradict Kanazawa’s hypothesis by demonstrating that performance on an evolutionary novel problem (an abstract reasoning task) predicts performance on an evolutionary familiar problem (a social reasoning task).
Shaul Kimhy • Shifra Sagy
Moral justification and feelings of adjustment to military law-enforcement situation: The case of Israeli soldiers serving at army roadblocks
Abstract
The research examined the use of moral justification as a mediating mechanism of stress, used by compulsory Israeli soldiers who had served at army roadblocks in the West Bank. Employing Bandura's model of moral disengagement, we expected that the greater the justification of army roadblocks by the soldier, the more he would feel adjusted to army demands. Feelings of adjustment to this situation were examined using three components: cognitive, affective and behavioral. The sample was composed of 170 Israeli ex-soldiers who had served for at least one month at army roadblocks in the West Bank during the Al-Aksa Intifada. The results supported the hypothesis regarding association between moral justification and feelings of adjustment at the end of army service. The mediating hypothesis was partially supported. Significance of moral justification as a mechanism of coping with the enforced situation of military law is discussed.
Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik
Refusing to budge: A confirmatory bias in decision making?
Abstract
Confirmatory bias, defined as the tendency to misinterpret new pieces of evidence as confirming previously held hypotheses, can lead to implacable, even incorrect decision making. It is one of the biases, along with anchoring, framing, and other judgment heuristic errors, that may lead to non-optimal behavior. This paper tests for the existence of confirmatory bias behavior in a uniquely economic setting (tax policy) and in a context relatively lacking in ambiguity. It also tests whether the confirmatory bias phenomenon can be prevalent enough to affect aggregate outcomes, a characteristic important in economic models in particular. The results indicate not only that confirmatory bias exists, but that the confirmatory bias effect may be stronger for evidence relating to losses than for comparable evidence relating to gains.
David Mandel • Oshin Vartanian
Taboo or tragic: effect of tradeoff type on moral choice, conflict, and confidence
Abstract
Historically, cognitivists considered moral choices to be determined by analytic processes. Recent theories, however, have emphasized the role of intuitive processes in determining moral choices. We propose that the engagement of analytic and intuitive processes is contingent on the type of tradeoff being considered. Specifically, when a tradeoff necessarily violates a moral principle no matter what choice is made, as in tragic tradeoffs, its resolution should result in greater moral conflict and less confidence in choice than when the tradeoff offers a moral escape route, as in taboo tradeoffs. We manipulated tradeoff type in a between-subjects design and confirmed the prediction that tragic tradeoffs prompt more conflict and less confidence than taboo tradeoffs. The findings further revealed that moral conflict mediated the effect of tradeoff type on confidence. The study sheds light on the manner in which human minds resolve moral problems involving social agents.
Andrea Pozzali
Tacit Knowledge, implicit learning and scientific reasoning
Abstract
The concept of tacit knowledge is widely used in social sciences to refer to all those knowledge that cannot be codified and have to be transferred by personal contacts. All this literature has been affected by two kind of “biases”: (1) the interest has been focused more on the result (tacit knowledge) than on the process (implicit learning); (2) “tacit knowledge” has been somehow reduced to physical skills or know-how; other possible forms of tacit knowledge have been neglected. These two “biases” seem interconnected one with each other. A greater consideration of the role and relevance of implicit learning allows us to consider tacit knowledge as something more than pure physical skills or know how. This is the first step in order to develop more detailed categorisation of the different forms that tacit knowledge can assume.
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